What this design covers, and what it leaves
The same field every pipeline is drawn on. A reference design is a position taken on it, so the cells it does not fill are as much a part of the position as the ones it does — this one is deliberately deep in some streams and silent in others.
- GOV Governance and assurance
- The stream that decides what blocks, and proves it blocked.
- SUP Open source and third-party supply
- Everything you did not write, arriving faster than you can review it.
- DEV Design and development
- Where the cost of a fix is lowest and the attention is shortest.
- DEL Build and delivery
- The machine that makes the thing, and the largest single target in the chain.
- VER Testing and validation
- The stream that finds out whether any of the others worked.
- OPS Runtime and platform
- The last place to stop something, and the most expensive.
- OBS Detection and continuous observation
- The only stream whose answer changes while nothing else does.
The figure is how many controls the field places in that cell and the wash behind it is how much of the cell you have decided — 26 targeted, 0 ignored, 307 still open, of 333. A ring means the cell is closed. Your 17 controls account for 26 of those, because a control that belongs at build and again at deploy is two decisions about where it runs rather than one. Ignoring a control counts as decided and leaves the denominator, so coverage measures what you said you would do rather than everything that exists.
The dashed rules are the two boundaries every pipeline has, whatever its platform: intake at build and release at release. Both default open — nothing is refused unless something was configured to refuse it.
The columns are drawn as a row here and as a loop elsewhere, and the same eight phases are the eight color groups a player walks around the DevSecOpoly board, in these same colors. The shape is a convenience. What is real is that each phase is a set of activities, and an activity is only worth doing because it enables a capability.
Stages and gates
Each control is a link to the products that provide it, and each of those opens its full profile. Blocking gates fail the build; advisory, monitor and manual ones do not.
This is a reference design, so no products are assigned to its stages. Each control links to the products that provide it, and where two or more of those carry evaluation scores you can compare them head to head.
- 01
Model and dataset intake
03Build4 controls · 3 blocking
- AI Model File ScanningBlocking · AI Model & Agent SecurityList only3 products
- AI Model Provenance & SigningBlocking · AI Model & Agent SecurityList only2 products
- AI Bill of Materials GenerationBlocking · SBOM & Component VisibilityList only3 products
- AI Model & Dataset InventoryAdvisory · AI Model & Agent SecurityList only5 products
- 02
Application build
03Build4 controls · 3 blocking
- Software Composition AnalysisBlocking · Dependency ManagementCompare7 scored of 23
- Malicious Package DetectionBlocking · Dependency ManagementCompare3 scored of 14
- Static Application Security TestingBlocking · Static Code AnalysisCompare19 scored of 21
- AI-Generated Code Vulnerability DetectionAdvisory · Developer Security & Secure CodingCompare3 scored of 4
- 03
AI security evaluation
04Test2 controls · 1 blocking
- 04
Agent and tool governance
06Deploy3 controls · 3 blocking
- 05
AI runtime protection
07Operate4 controls · 3 blocking
- Prompt Injection DetectionMonitor · AI Model & Agent SecurityList only7 products
- AI Guardrails & Output FilteringBlocking · AI Model & Agent SecurityList only7 products
- AI Sensitive Data Leakage PreventionBlocking · AI Model & Agent SecurityList only3 products
- API Rate Limiting & Abuse PreventionBlocking · API SecurityList only6 products
Framework coverage
Controls these capabilities let you evidence. Partial is the normal case; the remainder is the work.
ASVS 5.0
5 of 17
OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) 5.0.0
V1 · V2 · V5 · V9 · V15
CI/CD Top 10
3 of 10
OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks
CICD-SEC-2 · CICD-SEC-3 · CICD-SEC-6
S2C2F
4 of 25
OpenSSF Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework (S2C2F)
ING-3 · SCA-1 · SCA-2 · SCA-4
SSDF 1.1
7 of 42
NIST Secure Software Development Framework 1.1 (SP 800-218)
PS.2.1 · PW.4.1 · PW.7.1 · RV.1.1 · PW.7.2 · RV.1.2 · PW.4.4
Scorecard
2 of 20
OpenSSF Scorecard Checks
SAST · Vulnerabilities
Coverage by phase
Build
3 countered · 8 open of 11
Test
Not modeledNo attack techniques are modeled against this phase yet. That is a gap in our model, not evidence the phase is safe.
Deploy
0 countered · 1 open of 1
Operate
6 countered · 7 open of 13
Attacks this pipeline faces
Techniques modeled against the phases this pipeline covers, ordered by how many documented real-world incidents used them.
Trusted Supplier Compromise
Open12 real incidentsCommon · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 5 capabilities that would: Commercial Software Binary Composition Analysis, Continuous Vendor Risk Monitoring, Nth-Party Dependency Mapping, SaaS & CI/CD Integration Governance, and others.
CI Runner Secret Exfiltration
Open5 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 4 capabilities that would: Build Egress Control & Network Monitoring, Pipeline Permission Minimization, Pipeline Runtime Anomaly Detection, Secrets Detection in CI Logs & Artifacts.
Exploitation of Known Vulnerable Component
Countered5 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Countered by Software Composition Analysis.
Leaked Secret Abuse
Countered5 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Countered by Workload Identity Federation.
Malicious Install-Time Script
Countered5 real incidentsVery Common · Build
Countered by Malicious Package Detection.
Adversary-in-the-Middle MFA Phishing
Open2 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: Developer & Maintainer MFA Enforcement, Multi-Factor Authentication, Phishing & Business Email Compromise Protection.
Build Cache Poisoning
Open2 real incidentsEmerging · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: Build Cache Poisoning Prevention, Untrusted Workflow Trigger Isolation.
Dependency Confusion
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 4 capabilities that would: Dependency Confusion Prevention, Dependency Curation & Allowlisting, Namespace & Package Name Reservation, Private Registry Proxy & Curation.
Mutable Tag Hijack of CI Actions and Images
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 7 capabilities that would: CI/CD Configuration Scanning, Curated Hardened Action Catalog, Image Digest Pinning Enforcement, Immutable Artifact Versioning, and others.
Pwn Request (Privileged Trigger Abuse)
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 1 capability that would: Untrusted Workflow Trigger Isolation.
Self-Propagating Package Worm
Countered2 real incidentsEmerging · Build
Countered by Malicious Package Detection.
Workflow Script Injection
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: CI/CD Configuration Scanning, Workflow Injection Detection.
13 further techniques with no documented incidents
Not in this comparison
- Does not apply to this kind of pipeline
- phases A reference pipeline has authored stages rather than a phase grouping.
- gaps Gap analysis compares a stage's capabilities against the products that stage uses, and only a client pipeline records products in use. A reference pipeline models the design, not an estate.
How this was produced
Every figure above was read from the Gantry knowledge graph, version 7.1.0, and computed when you opened this page — in 202 ms on 2026-10-27. Nothing here is a cached verdict or a dataset assembled for marketing: it is the same model our engagements run on.