Compose a pipeline
Pick the domains you are responsible for. Every control the graph holds for them is placed into the lifecycle phase where it belongs, with the frameworks it evidences and the attacks it stops.
Domains
- Static Code Analysis20
- Dependency Management24
- Container Security24
- Exposure & Vulnerability Management15
- Endpoint Protection6
- Secrets & Identity Security24
- Build Integrity & Cryptographic Trust19
- CI/CD Pipeline Security10
- Runtime Application Validation25
- Runtime & Kubernetes Protection×
- AI Model & Agent Security16
- Identity & Access Management×
- Cloud Security Posture14
- Package Registry & Provenance Security13
- API Security12
- Detection & Response12
- SBOM & Component Visibility12
- Vendor Governance12
- Infrastructure-as-Code Security11
- Developer Security & Secure Coding10
- Secure Design & Threat Modeling10
- Governance, Risk & Compliance8
- Source Control Security8
- Data Protection2
- Email & Collaboration Security1
Maturity ceiling
Controls carry the maturity level a program needs to run them. Raising the ceiling adds depth and volume; level 3 is a realistic target for most teams.
- GOV Governance and assurance
- The stream that decides what blocks, and proves it blocked.
- SUP Open source and third-party supply
- Everything you did not write, arriving faster than you can review it.
- DEV Design and development
- Where the cost of a fix is lowest and the attention is shortest.
- DEL Build and delivery
- The machine that makes the thing, and the largest single target in the chain.
- VER Testing and validation
- The stream that finds out whether any of the others worked.
- OPS Runtime and platform
- The last place to stop something, and the most expensive.
- OBS Detection and continuous observation
- The only stream whose answer changes while nothing else does.
The figure is how many controls the field places in that cell and the wash behind it is how much of the cell you have decided — 2 targeted, 0 ignored, 331 still open, of 333. A ring means the cell is closed. Your 2 controls account for 2 of those, because a control that belongs at build and again at deploy is two decisions about where it runs rather than one. Ignoring a control counts as decided and leaves the denominator, so coverage measures what you said you would do rather than everything that exists.
The dashed rules are the two boundaries every pipeline has, whatever its platform: intake at build and release at release. Both default open — nothing is refused unless something was configured to refuse it.
The columns are drawn as a row here and as a loop elsewhere, and the same eight phases are the eight color groups a player walks around the DevSecOpoly board, in these same colors. The shape is a convenience. What is real is that each phase is a set of activities, and an activity is only worth doing because it enables a capability.
Framework coverage
What this selection alone would let you evidence.
ASVS 5.0
2 of 17
OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) 5.0.0
V6 · V10
CI/CD Top 10
1 of 10
OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks
CICD-SEC-2
Coverage by phase
Operate
1 countered · 12 open of 13
What this selection leaves open
Trusted Supplier Compromise
Open12 real incidentsCommon · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 5 capabilities that would: Commercial Software Binary Composition Analysis, Continuous Vendor Risk Monitoring, Nth-Party Dependency Mapping, SaaS & CI/CD Integration Governance, and others.
Exploitation of Known Vulnerable Component
Open5 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 7 capabilities that would: Container Image Vulnerability Scanning, Coverage-Guided Fuzzing, Minimal Hardened Base Images, Risk-Based Vulnerability Prioritization, and others.
Leaked Secret Abuse
Open5 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 5 capabilities that would: Dynamic Short-Lived Credentials, Leaked Credential Validation & Revocation, Secret Push Protection, Secrets Detection in Source Code, and others.
Adversary-in-the-Middle MFA Phishing
Countered2 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Countered by Multi-Factor Authentication.
AI Agent Privilege Abuse
Open1 real incidentEmerging · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: AI Agent & MCP Server Governance, AI Coding Assistant Security Guardrails, Non-Human Identity Discovery & Governance.
Cloud Misconfiguration Exploitation
Open1 real incidentVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: Cloud Security Posture Management, IaC Misconfiguration Scanning, IaC Plan-Time Policy Evaluation.
Exposed Kubernetes Control Interface
Open1 real incidentCommon · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: Kubernetes Manifest & Helm Chart Scanning, Kubernetes Security Posture Management.
Injection Exploitation
Open1 real incidentVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 6 capabilities that would: Dynamic Application Security Testing, Interactive Application Security Testing, Runtime Application Self-Protection, Static Application Security Testing, and others.
Broken Object Level Authorization Exploitation
OpenVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: API Runtime Threat Protection, Authenticated DAST Scanning, Broken Object Level Authorization Testing.
Direct and Indirect Prompt Injection
OpenVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 1 capability that would: Prompt Injection Detection.
MCP Tool Poisoning
OpenEmerging · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: AI Agent & MCP Server Governance, MCP Tool Poisoning Detection.
Malicious or Compromised OAuth Integration
OpenCommon · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: Non-Human Identity Discovery & Governance, Repository Access Governance, SaaS & CI/CD Integration Governance.
1 further technique with no documented incidents
Not in this comparison
- Does not apply to this kind of pipeline
- stages A composed pipeline has no authored stages; its capabilities are grouped by lifecycle phase.
- gaps Gap analysis compares a stage's capabilities against the products that stage uses, and only a client pipeline records products in use. A composed pipeline models the design, not an estate.
How this was produced
Every figure above was read from the Gantry knowledge graph, version 7.1.0, and computed when you opened this page — in 305 ms on 2026-10-27. Nothing here is a cached verdict or a dataset assembled for marketing: it is the same model our engagements run on.