Secure Software Factory (GitHub Actions to Kubernetes)
What this design covers, and what it leaves
The same field every pipeline is drawn on. A reference design is a position taken on it, so the cells it does not fill are as much a part of the position as the ones it does — this one is deliberately deep in some streams and silent in others.
- GOV Governance and assurance
- The stream that decides what blocks, and proves it blocked.
- SUP Open source and third-party supply
- Everything you did not write, arriving faster than you can review it.
- DEV Design and development
- Where the cost of a fix is lowest and the attention is shortest.
- DEL Build and delivery
- The machine that makes the thing, and the largest single target in the chain.
- VER Testing and validation
- The stream that finds out whether any of the others worked.
- OPS Runtime and platform
- The last place to stop something, and the most expensive.
- OBS Detection and continuous observation
- The only stream whose answer changes while nothing else does.
The figure is how many controls the field places in that cell and the wash behind it is how much of the cell you have decided — 65 targeted, 0 ignored, 268 still open, of 333. A ring means the cell is closed. Your 46 controls account for 65 of those, because a control that belongs at build and again at deploy is two decisions about where it runs rather than one. Ignoring a control counts as decided and leaves the denominator, so coverage measures what you said you would do rather than everything that exists.
The dashed rules are the two boundaries every pipeline has, whatever its platform: intake at build and release at release. Both default open — nothing is refused unless something was configured to refuse it.
The columns are drawn as a row here and as a loop elsewhere, and the same eight phases are the eight color groups a player walks around the DevSecOpoly board, in these same colors. The shape is a convenience. What is real is that each phase is a set of activities, and an activity is only worth doing because it enables a capability.
Stages and gates
Each control is a link to the products that provide it, and each of those opens its full profile. Blocking gates fail the build; advisory, monitor and manual ones do not.
This is a reference design, so no products are assigned to its stages. Each control links to the products that provide it, and where two or more of those carry evaluation scores you can compare them head to head.
- 01
Source control
02Code6 controls · 6 blocking
- Branch Protection & Ruleset EnforcementBlocking · Source Control SecurityList only1 scored of 5
- Code Review EnforcementBlocking · Source Control SecurityList only1 scored of 4
- Commit Signing & VerificationBlocking · Source Control SecurityList only3 products
- Workflow Change Review EnforcementBlocking · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityNo product
- Secret Push ProtectionBlocking · Secrets & Identity SecurityList only1 scored of 4
- Developer & Maintainer MFA EnforcementBlocking · Source Control SecurityList only2 products
- 02
Dependency intake
02Code7 controls · 5 blocking
- Private Registry Proxy & CurationBlocking · Package Registry & Provenance SecurityList only10 products
- Malicious Package DetectionBlocking · Dependency ManagementCompare3 scored of 14
- Minimum Release Age EnforcementBlocking · Dependency ManagementList only1 scored of 5
- Install Script Execution RestrictionBlocking · Dependency ManagementNo product
- Software Composition AnalysisAdvisory · Dependency ManagementCompare7 scored of 23
- Reachability AnalysisAdvisory · Dependency ManagementCompare4 scored of 8
- Dependency Pinning & Lockfile Integrity VerificationBlocking · Dependency ManagementNo product
- 03
Workflow and runner hardening
03Build6 controls · 4 blocking
- Third-Party Action & Plugin Pinning EnforcementBlocking · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityList only6 products
- CI/CD Configuration ScanningBlocking · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityList only1 scored of 7
- Untrusted Workflow Trigger IsolationBlocking · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityNo product
- Pipeline Permission MinimizationBlocking · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityList only4 products
- Ephemeral Isolated Build RunnersMonitor · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityList only2 products
- Build Egress Control & Network MonitoringMonitor · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityOne product1 product
- 04
Build credentials
03Build3 controls · 1 blocking
- 05
Build and analyze
03Build6 controls · 4 blocking
- Static Application Security TestingBlocking · Static Code AnalysisCompare19 scored of 21
- Incremental Diff ScanningBlocking · Static Code AnalysisCompare8 scored of 8
- SBOM GenerationBlocking · SBOM & Component VisibilityCompare4 scored of 28
- Container Image Vulnerability ScanningAdvisory · Container SecurityList only1 scored of 20
- IaC Misconfiguration ScanningBlocking · Infrastructure-as-Code SecurityList only1 scored of 9
- Minimal Hardened Base ImagesAdvisory · Container SecurityCompare2 scored of 14
- 06
Test and verify
04Test4 controls · 2 blocking
- Security Unit & Regression TestingBlocking · Developer Security & Secure CodingNo product
- Dynamic Application Security TestingAdvisory · Runtime Application ValidationList only1 scored of 8
- API Security TestingAdvisory · API SecurityList only12 products
- Broken Object Level Authorization TestingBlocking · API SecurityList only2 products
- 07
Artifact signing and publication
05Release6 controls · 5 blocking
- Keyless Signing with Transparency LogBlocking · Build Integrity & Cryptographic TrustList only1 scored of 8
- Build Provenance AttestationBlocking · Build Integrity & Cryptographic TrustCompare3 scored of 15
- SBOM Signing & AttestationBlocking · SBOM & Component VisibilityCompare3 scored of 4
- Immutable Artifact VersioningBlocking · Package Registry & Provenance SecurityList only9 products
- Trusted PublishingBlocking · Package Registry & Provenance SecurityList only2 products
- Deployment Environment ProtectionManual · CI/CD Pipeline SecurityList only2 products
- 08
Deployment and admission
06Deploy4 controls · 4 blocking
- Signature & Provenance Admission EnforcementBlocking · Package Registry & Provenance SecurityList only5 products
- Kubernetes Admission ControlBlocking · Runtime & Kubernetes ProtectionList only6 products
- IaC Plan-Time Policy EvaluationBlocking · Infrastructure-as-Code SecurityList only5 products
- Workload Runtime HardeningBlocking · Runtime & Kubernetes ProtectionList only5 products
- 09
Runtime monitoring and response
08Monitor4 controls
- Runtime Threat DetectionMonitor · Runtime & Kubernetes ProtectionList only14 products
- Engineering Platform Audit Log MonitoringMonitor · Detection & ResponseList only6 products
- Risk-Based Vulnerability PrioritizationMonitor · Exposure & Vulnerability ManagementCompare3 scored of 11
- Supply Chain Incident ResponseMonitor · Detection & ResponseOne product1 product
Framework coverage
Controls these capabilities let you evidence. Partial is the normal case; the remainder is the work.
ASVS 5.0
9 of 17
OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) 5.0.0
V1 · V3 · V4 · V5 · V8 · V9 · V13 · V15 · V16
CI/CD Top 10
10 of 10
OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks
CICD-SEC-1 · CICD-SEC-10 · CICD-SEC-2 · CICD-SEC-3 · CICD-SEC-4 · CICD-SEC-5 · CICD-SEC-6 · CICD-SEC-7 · CICD-SEC-8 · CICD-SEC-9
S2C2F
16 of 25
OpenSSF Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework (S2C2F)
AUD-2 · AUD-3 · AUD-4 · ENF-1 · ENF-2 · ING-2 · ING-3 · INV-1 · INV-2 · REB-3 · REB-4 · SCA-1 · +4 more
SLSA 1.2
10 of 16
Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) 1.2
Build L1 — Provenance generated and distributed · Build L2 — Consumer validates provenance · Build L2 — Hosted build platform · Build L2 — Signed provenance · Build L3 — Run isolation · Build L3 — Signing secrets isolated · Source L2 — Continuous immutable history · Source L2 — Source provenance attestations · Source L3 — Enforced technical controls · Source L4 — Two-party review
SSDF 1.1
15 of 42
NIST Secure Software Development Framework 1.1 (SP 800-218)
PO.5.1 · PS.1.1 · PS.2.1 · PW.4.1 · PW.7.1 · PW.8.1 · PW.9.1 · RV.1.1 · RV.2.1 · PS.3.2 · PW.7.2 · PW.8.2 · +3 more
Scorecard
8 of 20
OpenSSF Scorecard Checks
Branch-Protection · Code-Review · Dangerous-Workflow · Pinned-Dependencies · SAST · SBOM · Token-Permissions · Vulnerabilities
Coverage by phase
Code
1 countered · 3 open of 4
Build
10 countered · 1 open of 11
Test
Not modeledNo attack techniques are modeled against this phase yet. That is a gap in our model, not evidence the phase is safe.
Release
3 countered · 1 open of 4
Deploy
1 countered · 0 open of 1
Monitor
Not modeledNo attack techniques are modeled against this phase yet. That is a gap in our model, not evidence the phase is safe.
Attacks this pipeline faces
Techniques modeled against the phases this pipeline covers, ordered by how many documented real-world incidents used them.
Maintainer Account Takeover
Countered10 real incidentsCommon · Release
Countered by Developer & Maintainer MFA Enforcement, Malicious Package Detection, Minimum Release Age Enforcement, Trusted Publishing.
Stolen Publishing Token
Countered9 real incidentsCommon · Release
Countered by Deployment Environment Protection, Engineering Platform Audit Log Monitoring, Trusted Publishing.
Artifact Tampering After Build
Countered7 real incidentsCommon · Release
Countered by Build Provenance Attestation, Dependency Pinning & Lockfile Integrity Verification, Immutable Artifact Versioning, Keyless Signing with Transparency Log.
CI Runner Secret Exfiltration
Countered5 real incidentsCommon · Build
Countered by Build Egress Control & Network Monitoring, Pipeline Permission Minimization, Secrets Detection in CI Logs & Artifacts.
Malicious Install-Time Script
Countered5 real incidentsVery Common · Build
Countered by Install Script Execution Restriction, Malicious Package Detection.
Abandoned Package or Domain Takeover
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Release
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: Maintainer & Publisher Risk Analysis, Open Source Project Health Scoring.
Build Cache Poisoning
Countered2 real incidentsEmerging · Build
Countered by Untrusted Workflow Trigger Isolation.
Dependency Confusion
Countered2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Countered by Private Registry Proxy & Curation.
Mutable Tag Hijack of CI Actions and Images
Countered2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Countered by CI/CD Configuration Scanning, Immutable Artifact Versioning, Supply Chain Incident Response, Third-Party Action & Plugin Pinning Enforcement.
Pwn Request (Privileged Trigger Abuse)
Countered2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Countered by Untrusted Workflow Trigger Isolation.
Self-Propagating Package Worm
Countered2 real incidentsEmerging · Build
Countered by Install Script Execution Restriction, Malicious Package Detection, Minimum Release Age Enforcement, Supply Chain Incident Response.
Unauthorized Commit Injection
Countered2 real incidentsCommon · Code
Countered by Branch Protection & Ruleset Enforcement, Code Review Enforcement, Commit Signing & Verification, Workflow Change Review Enforcement.
8 further techniques with no documented incidents
Not in this comparison
- Does not apply to this kind of pipeline
- phases A reference pipeline has authored stages rather than a phase grouping.
- gaps Gap analysis compares a stage's capabilities against the products that stage uses, and only a client pipeline records products in use. A reference pipeline models the design, not an estate.
How this was produced
Every figure above was read from the Gantry knowledge graph, version 7.1.0, and computed when you opened this page — in 297 ms on 2026-10-27. Nothing here is a cached verdict or a dataset assembled for marketing: it is the same model our engagements run on.