Container Security

Now pick what to compare Clair against.

Clair clear

Open a name for its full profile

Chainguard Containers
Scored
Chainguard · Freemium · 3 capabilities in this domain · 4.04 / 5
Compare →
Docker Hardened Images
Scored
Docker · Freemium · 3 capabilities in this domain · 4.00 / 5
Compare →
Chainguard VMs
Capabilities only
Chainguard · Commercial · 3 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Docker Scout
Capabilities only
Docker · Freemium · 3 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Echo Container Images
Capabilities only
Echo · Commercial · 3 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
RapidFort
Capabilities only
RapidFort · Freemium · 3 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Snyk Container
Capabilities only
Snyk · Freemium · 3 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
The Guardener
Capabilities only
Chainguard · Commercial · 3 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Bitnami Secure Images
Capabilities only
Bitnami · Commercial · 2 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Chainguard OS Packages
Capabilities only
Chainguard · Commercial · 2 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Iron Bank
Capabilities only
Platform One (U.S. Department of Defense) · Free · 2 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Minimus
Capabilities only
Minimus · Commercial · 2 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Clair
Capabilities only
Red Hat · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
selected
Copacetic
Capabilities only
Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Docker Bench for Security
Capabilities only
Docker · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Dockle
Capabilities only
Goodwith Tech · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Google Distroless
Capabilities only
Google · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Grype
Capabilities only
Anchore · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Hadolint
Capabilities only
Hadolint Project · Open Source · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →
Microsoft Defender for Containers
Capabilities only
Microsoft · Commercial · 1 capabilities in this domain
Compare →

In Container Security

Chainguard Containers

Chainguard · Container Security

Close ×

FreemiumCompany4.04 / 5

Chainguard Containers (formerly Chainguard Images) include only the application runtime and its dependencies, run as non-root by default, are rebuilt continuously as upstream fixes land and ship with signed SBOMs and provenance. Development variants add shells and package managers for build stages.

Website ↗

What it does8 capabilities · 8 at full coverage

8 of 8 at full coverage, 6 through a named feature.

Artifact SigningFullBUILD · via a feature · level 2 · 11 providers
Build Provenance AttestationFullBUILD · via a feature · level 3 · 15 providers
Base Image CVE Remediation AutomationFullCONTAINER · via a feature · level 3 · 12 providers
Continuous Image Rebuild & Freshness ManagementFullCONTAINER · via a feature · level 4 · 6 providers
Minimal Hardened Base ImagesFullCONTAINER · via a feature · level 3 · 14 providers
Rebuilt-from-Source Dependency ProvisioningFullDEPS · level 5 · 6 providers
SBOM GenerationFullSBOM · via a feature · level 2 · 28 providers
SBOM Signing & AttestationFullSBOM · level 4 · 4 providers

What it proves35 controls across 13 frameworks

Satisfied through its capabilities, not claimed by the vendor.

S2C2F7 / 25AUD-4 ING-4 INV-1 REB-1 REB-2 REB-3 REB-4
CRA6 / 41Annex I Part I (2)(b) Annex I Part I (2)(f) Annex I Part I (2)(j) Annex I Part II (1) Annex I Part II (2) Annex I Part II (7)
SAMM 2.05 / 90I-SB-2-B O-EM-1-B O-EM-2-A O-EM-2-B O-EM-3-B
SSDF 1.13 / 42PS.2.1 PS.3.2 PW.9.1
CIS Controls2 / 18CIS 2 CIS 4
CSF 2.02 / 106ID.AM-02 PR.PS-02
DSOMM2 / 19BD-Patch-Management IM-Infrastructure-Hardening
SLSA 1.22 / 16Build L1 — Provenance generated and distributed Build L2 — Signed provenance
Scorecard2 / 20SBOM Signed-Releases
CI/CD Top 101 / 10CICD-SEC-9
CIS Benchmarks1 / 6CIS Docker Benchmark
OWASP Top 101 / 10A08:2025
SP 800-204D1 / 11204D-CI-EVIDENCE

What it stops10 techniques · 3 risks

10 techniques countered, 5 of them common

Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059Very Common
Exploitation of Known Vulnerable ComponentVery Common
Artifact Tampering After BuildCommon
Escape to HostT1611Common
Stolen Publishing TokenCommon
SLSA threat D: Build from modified source or parametersSLSA-D
SLSA threat DEP: Dependency threat (A–H applied recursively)SLSA-DEP
SLSA threat E: Compromised build processSLSA-E
SLSA threat F: Upload of a modified artifactSLSA-F
SLSA threat G: Compromised distribution channelSLSA-G

3 risks reduced

Released artifact does not match reviewed sourceCritical
Cannot determine exposure to a compromised componentHigh
Exploitable vulnerabilities in container base imagesHigh

Where it runs3 phases · 1 way to deploy

Capabilities per lifecycle phase

Build8
Release2
Operate1

How it is delivered

Container image catalog

What it unlocks9 activities · reaches level 5

Program activities its capabilities support, reaching level 5. Supporting an activity is not completing it.

Level 1

Generate SBOMs for critical releasesLow effort

Level 2

SBOM for every build in SPDX and CycloneDXLow effort
Sign release artifactsLow effort

Level 3

Signed SLSA provenance for every artifactLow effort
Standardize on minimal hardened base imagesMedium effort

Level 4

Image freshness SLOs and malware scanningMedium effort
Signed SBOM attestations and published VEXMedium effort

Level 5

Consume dependencies rebuilt from verified sourceHigh effort
Near-zero known vulnerabilities in production imagesHigh effort

How it holds up14 criteria scored · 4 strengths · 4 limitations

Scored 0 to 5 against the evaluation criteria

Coverage from pre-commit to runtime3.4
Language, framework and ecosystem breadth4.5
Cloud-native support4.7
Software supply chain and vendor risk visibility4.8
Context-driven prioritization3.0
CI/CD and developer workflow integration3.4
APIs and extensibility3.8
Actionable remediation guidance4.2
Accuracy and noise4.8
Verifiable integrity and provenance4.9
Governance and compliance reporting4.3
AI capability maturity and AI security coverage3.0
Total cost and licensing fit3.6
Operational effort and skills required4.0

Strengths

Near-zero known CVEs with contractual remediation SLAs
Signed SBOMs and provenance by default with no pipeline work
FIPS variants for regulated workloads
Removes attacker tooling from the runtime image

Limitations

Migration effort from Debian or Alpine-based images
Versioned tags and the full catalog require a subscription
Debugging without a shell requires new operational habits
Catalog coverage may not include every niche runtime a team uses

Best for

Teams drowning in container CVE findings
FedRAMP and regulated environments
Organizations that must produce CRA or SSDF artifact evidence

Proof points

Production variants ship with no shell and no package manager
Rebuilt as upstream fixes land rather than on a distribution release cadence
SBOM is produced by the builder, not inferred by a scanner after the fact
FIPS variants available for regulated workloads

How the analysis works

Not an analysis product — it removes findings by changing what is in the image; verification is by signature, SBOM and provenance rather than by scanning

How it works

Chainguard builds every package from source into Wolfi, its container-oriented Linux undistro, using melange, then assembles images declaratively with apko rather than by executing a Dockerfile. Because assembly is declarative and the package set is explicit, the builder knows exactly what is in the image and emits an authoritative SBOM rather than one inferred by scanning afterwards. Production variants exclude the shell, the package manager and root, so both the vulnerability surface and the attacker's post-exploitation toolkit are absent. The whole catalog is rebuilt continuously as upstream fixes land, and each image is signed with Sigstore and published with its SBOM and SLSA provenance as attestations that admission controllers can verify.

Organization size it suits

Mid-market through large enterprise; strongest where container CVE backlog or FedRAMP evidence is already a tracked problem

What it costs4 tiers · Per image or catalog subscription · free tier

LicensingPer image or catalog subscription

Priced perimage or catalog per year

BillingSubscription

Scales withNumber of hardened images or catalog tier consumed

Free imagesFreeimage · AnnualLatest tags only, no versioned or minor tags · No contractual CVE remediation SLA · Five images per organization
Per imageContact salesimage · Annual
Catalog$19,000year · Annual
Planning estimateestimate$45,000year · Annual

Total cost

Compare against engineering time spent triaging and patching base-image CVEs.

What it takes to run0.5 FTE at peak · 1 role · 5 evidence outputs

Peak staffing0.5 FTE

Roles it needs

Platform Engineer0.25–0.5 FTE

Evidence it produces

Sigstore signature recorded in the Rekor transparency logBuild-time SBOM in SPDX format attached as an in-toto attestationSLSA build provenance attestationFIPS-validated cryptographic module attestation for FIPS variantsContinuously updated vulnerability posture per image tag

Compliance reporting

EU Cyber Resilience Act Annex I SBOM and vulnerability handling evidenceSSDF PS.3 and PW.4 provenance and component evidenceSLSA build level provenance for consumed artifactsFedRAMP and FIPS 140 cryptographic module requirements via FIPS variants

Deployment

No agent and no pipeline integration is required to start — the change is the FROM line and the registry reference. Verification is optional but recommended: cosign in CI or a policy controller at admission turns the attached attestations into an enforced control.

Migrating to it

The work is in what the images deliberately lack. Dockerfiles that shell out during build, install packages at runtime, or assume root need restructuring to multi-stage builds using the development variant for the build stage and the production variant for the final image. Entry-point scripts written in shell must be replaced or moved into the build. Teams typically migrate one high-volume base image first to establish the pattern, then the language runtimes. Budget for the versioned-tag subscription: pinning to a specific version rather than latest is a paid capability and most production teams need it.

What it works with4 standards · 3 features

Named features

Continuous rebuilds with CVE remediation SLAsImages are rebuilt as upstream fixes land rather than on a distribution release cadence, under contractual remediation timeframes.
Sigstore signatures with SBOM and SLSA provenanceEvery image is signed with Sigstore and published with an SBOM and SLSA build provenance attached as attestations.
Wolfi-based minimal imagesImages assembled from Wolfi packages with apko, containing only the application runtime and its direct dependencies.

Standards and formats

OCI Image SpecificationSLSA Provenance PredicateSPDX (ISO/IEC 5962)Sigstore Bundle

What else to look at6 alternatives · 1 comparable head to head · 9 siblings

Comparable head to head

Docker Hardened Imagesweighted →

Open-source alternatives

Bitnami Secure ImagesCommercial
Docker Hardened ImagesFreemium · 4.00
Echo Container ImagesCommercial
Google DistrolessOpen Source
Iron BankFree
RapidFortFreemium

Same family

Chainguard ActionsCommercial
Chainguard FactoryCommercial
Chainguard LibrariesCommercial
Chainguard OS PackagesCommercial
Chainguard VMsCommercial
The GuardenerCommercial
WolfiOpen Source
apkoOpen Source
melangeOpen Source

What backs this up1 measurement

Measured, with how much to trust it

Median Known Vulnerabilities per Production Image0Vendor states near-zero known CVEs across its catalogVendor-Reported · 2026-01-01

Gantry 7.1.0 · OFF.12 · OFF.13