Dependency Management

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In Dependency Management

Chainguard Libraries

Chainguard · Dependency Management

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CommercialCompany

Chainguard Libraries removes the consumer's implicit trust in upstream maintainers' build machines and publishing credentials by rebuilding packages from source on infrastructure Chainguard controls and can attest to, then serving them with provenance and SBOMs. It is consumed as an upstream behind an existing repository manager such as Artifactory, Sonatype Nexus Repository or Cloudsmith, so builds resolve dependencies exactly as before.

What it does5 capabilities · 3 at full coverage

3 of 5 at full coverage, 5 through a named feature.

Build Provenance AttestationFullBUILD · via a feature · level 3 · 15 providers
Malicious Package DetectionPartialDEPS · via a feature · level 2 · 14 providers
Minimum Release Age EnforcementFullDEPS · via a feature · level 3 · 5 providers
Rebuilt-from-Source Dependency ProvisioningFullDEPS · via a feature · level 5 · 6 providers
Private Registry Proxy & CurationPartialREGISTRY · via a feature · level 2 · 10 providers

What it proves23 controls across 9 frameworks

Satisfied through its capabilities, not claimed by the vendor.

S2C2F10 / 25AUD-2 ENF-2 ING-2 ING-3 ING-4 REB-1 REB-2 REB-3 SCA-4 UPD-2
SSDF 1.13 / 42PS.2.1 PS.3.2 PW.4.1
OWASP Top 102 / 10A03:2025 A08:2025
SLSA 1.22 / 16Build L1 — Provenance generated and distributed Build L2 — Signed provenance
SP 800-204D2 / 11204D-CI-DEPS 204D-CI-EVIDENCE
CI/CD Top 101 / 10CICD-SEC-3
CIS Controls1 / 18CIS 10
CRA1 / 41Annex I Part I (2)(f)
LLM Top 101 / 10LLM03:2025

What it stops13 techniques · 3 risks

13 techniques countered, 6 of them common

Malicious Install-Time ScriptVery Common
Artifact Tampering After BuildCommon
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsT1195.001Common
Dependency ConfusionCommon
Maintainer Account TakeoverCommon
Stolen Publishing TokenCommon
Self-Propagating Package WormEmerging
Protestware and Maintainer SabotageRare
SLSA threat D: Build from modified source or parametersSLSA-D
SLSA threat DEP: Dependency threat (A–H applied recursively)SLSA-DEP
SLSA threat E: Compromised build processSLSA-E
SLSA threat F: Upload of a modified artifactSLSA-F
SLSA threat G: Compromised distribution channelSLSA-G

3 risks reduced

Malicious dependency executes in development or CICritical
Released artifact does not match reviewed sourceCritical
Unverified or tampered artifact is deployedHigh

Where it runs2 phases · 1 way to deploy

Capabilities per lifecycle phase

Code2
Build5

How it is delivered

SaaS

What it unlocks6 activities · reaches level 5

Program activities its capabilities support, reaching level 5. Supporting an activity is not completing it.

Level 1

Consume through an internal artifact repositoryMedium effort

Level 3

Block malicious packages with behavioral analysisMedium effort
Enforce release cooldowns and restrict install scriptsLow effort
Signed SLSA provenance for every artifactLow effort

Level 5

Consume dependencies rebuilt from verified sourceHigh effort
Near-zero known vulnerabilities in production imagesHigh effort

How it holds up3 strengths · 4 limitations · 2 uses it suits

Strengths

Protects against build-time and publishing-credential attacks
Drop-in upstream for existing repository managers
Same provenance and attestation format as the container catalog

Limitations

Coverage limited to supported ecosystems and a curated package set
Does not remove the need for curation on uncovered dependencies
Java
Python and JavaScript only

Best for

Organizations with build-integrity or provenance requirements
Teams that already run a repository manager they can repoint

Proof points

Defends against stolen maintainer publishing credentials, which signing alone does not
Built on the same infrastructure and attestation format as Chainguard Containers
Consumed as a remote repository, so build files and lockfiles are unchanged

How the analysis works

Not an analysis product — it replaces the provenance of the artifact itself; assurance comes from build provenance and source attestation rather than from scanning

How it works

For each supported package, Chainguard identifies the upstream source revision, builds it in a hermetic pipeline with declared dependencies on the same SLSA-aligned infrastructure that produces its container images, and publishes the artifact with SLSA provenance naming the source commit and builder, plus an SBOM. Organizations point the remote repository in their existing repository manager at Chainguard's registry, so resolution, caching and access control are unchanged and the switch is reversible.

What it costsPer image or catalog subscription

LicensingPer image or catalog subscription

Priced perimage or catalog per year

BillingSubscription

Scales withNumber of hardened images or catalog tier consumed

Total cost

Compare against engineering time spent triaging and patching base-image CVEs.

What it takes to run3 evidence outputs

Evidence it produces

SLSA build provenance naming the source revision and builderSBOM per library artifactSigstore signature for each published artifact

Compliance reporting

SSDF PS.2 and PW.4 provenance evidence for acquired componentsS2C2F rebuild and provenance practicesEU Cyber Resilience Act component provenance evidence

Migrating to it

Coverage is the deciding factor. Chainguard rebuilds a curated set of packages per ecosystem, so a build will resolve some dependencies from Chainguard and the remainder from the public registry through the same proxy. Teams should measure what share of their actual dependency tree is covered before assuming the control applies broadly, and keep the repository firewall or curation policy in place for the uncovered remainder.

What it works with3 languages · 3 features

Named features

Drop-in registry upstreamServed as an upstream that existing repository managers proxy, so adoption is a configuration change rather than a workflow change.
Rebuild from verified sourceEvery library is rebuilt from its upstream source repository on Chainguard's infrastructure rather than republished from the registry artifact.
Upstream fallback with release cooldownFor packages Chainguard has not rebuilt, the upstream version is served only after a holding period — seven days by default — so a malicious release is withdrawn before any build consumes it.

Languages

JavaJavaScript and TypeScriptPython

What else to look at4 alternatives · 1 comparable head to head · 9 siblings

Comparable head to head

Socketweighted →

Open-source alternatives

Echo LibrariesCommercial
JFrog CurationCommercial
SocketFreemium · 4.05
Sonatype Repository FirewallCommercial

Same family

Chainguard ActionsCommercial
Chainguard ContainersFreemium · 4.04
Chainguard FactoryCommercial
Chainguard OS PackagesCommercial
Chainguard VMsCommercial
The GuardenerCommercial
WolfiOpen Source
apkoOpen Source
melangeOpen Source

What backs this up

No measurement, incident or pipeline using it.

Gantry 7.1.0 · OFF.12 · OFF.13