Compose a pipeline
Pick the domains you are responsible for. Every control the graph holds for them is placed into the lifecycle phase where it belongs, with the frameworks it evidences and the attacks it stops.
Domains
- Static Code Analysis20
- Dependency Management24
- Container Security24
- Exposure & Vulnerability Management15
- Endpoint Protection×
- Secrets & Identity Security24
- Build Integrity & Cryptographic Trust19
- CI/CD Pipeline Security10
- Runtime Application Validation25
- Runtime & Kubernetes Protection24
- AI Model & Agent Security16
- Identity & Access Management16
- Cloud Security Posture14
- Package Registry & Provenance Security13
- API Security12
- Detection & Response12
- SBOM & Component Visibility×
- Vendor Governance12
- Infrastructure-as-Code Security11
- Developer Security & Secure Coding10
- Secure Design & Threat Modeling10
- Governance, Risk & Compliance×
- Source Control Security8
- Data Protection2
- Email & Collaboration Security1
Maturity ceiling
Controls carry the maturity level a program needs to run them. Raising the ceiling adds depth and volume; level 3 is a realistic target for most teams.
- GOV Governance and assurance
- The stream that decides what blocks, and proves it blocked.
- SUP Open source and third-party supply
- Everything you did not write, arriving faster than you can review it.
- DEV Design and development
- Where the cost of a fix is lowest and the attention is shortest.
- DEL Build and delivery
- The machine that makes the thing, and the largest single target in the chain.
- VER Testing and validation
- The stream that finds out whether any of the others worked.
- OPS Runtime and platform
- The last place to stop something, and the most expensive.
- OBS Detection and continuous observation
- The only stream whose answer changes while nothing else does.
The figure is how many controls the field places in that cell and the wash behind it is how much of the cell you have decided — 30 targeted, 0 ignored, 303 still open, of 333. A ring means the cell is closed. Your 20 controls account for 30 of those, because a control that belongs at build and again at deploy is two decisions about where it runs rather than one. Ignoring a control counts as decided and leaves the denominator, so coverage measures what you said you would do rather than everything that exists.
The dashed rules are the two boundaries every pipeline has, whatever its platform: intake at build and release at release. Both default open — nothing is refused unless something was configured to refuse it.
The columns are drawn as a row here and as a loop elsewhere, and the same eight phases are the eight color groups a player walks around the DevSecOpoly board, in these same colors. The shape is a convenience. What is real is that each phase is a set of activities, and an activity is only worth doing because it enables a capability.
20 capabilities appear 30 times, because a control can belong at more than one point in the lifecycle. Digest verification, for instance, is enforced at build and checked again at deploy — the same capability doing a different job.
- 01
Plan
6 capabilities
- Compliance Mapping & Control CrosswalkGRC · level 2 · 5 controlsList only7 products
- Policy as Code EnforcementGRC · level 3 · 9 controlsList only7 products
- Risk Register & Risk Acceptance TrackingGRC · level 2 · 6 controlsList only3 products
- Security Exception & Waiver ManagementGRC · level 2 · 4 controlsOne product1 product
- Security Policy ManagementGRC · level 1 · table stakes · 9 controlsList only2 products
- Security Program Maturity AssessmentGRC · level 2 · 5 controlsNo product
- 03
Build
4 capabilities
- 05
Release
4 capabilities
- Automated Evidence CollectionGRC · level 3 · 6 controlsList only8 products
- Security Exception & Waiver ManagementGRC · level 2 · 4 controlsOne product1 product
- SBOM Ingestion & ManagementSBOM · level 3 · 4 controlsList only10 products
- SBOM Quality & Completeness ValidationSBOM · level 3 · 2 controlsList only3 products
- 06
Deploy
1 capability
- 07
Operate
9 capabilities
- Automated Evidence CollectionGRC · level 3 · 6 controlsList only8 products
- Continuous Compliance MonitoringGRC · level 3 · 5 controlsList only9 products
- Compromised Component Blast-Radius AnalysisSBOM · level 3 · counters 2 · 4 controlsList only3 products
- Attack Surface ReductionENDPOINT · level 2 · counters 3 · 2 controlsList only1 scored of 4
- Device Isolation & ContainmentENDPOINT · level 3 · counters 2 · 1 controlsCompare2 scored of 5
- Endpoint Detection & ResponseENDPOINT · level 3 · counters 5 · 4 controlsCompare2 scored of 5
- Endpoint Vulnerability AssessmentENDPOINT · level 2 · 2 controlsList only1 scored of 4
- Exploit PreventionENDPOINT · level 2 · counters 2 · 2 controlsList only1 scored of 4
- Next-Generation AntivirusENDPOINT · level 2 · counters 3 · 2 controlsList only1 scored of 5
- 08
Monitor
6 capabilities
- Continuous Compliance MonitoringGRC · level 3 · 5 controlsList only9 products
- Risk Register & Risk Acceptance TrackingGRC · level 2 · 6 controlsList only3 products
- Security Metrics & ROI ReportingGRC · level 3 · 7 controlsOne product1 product
- Compromised Component Blast-Radius AnalysisSBOM · level 3 · counters 2 · 4 controlsList only3 products
- Continuous SBOM Vulnerability MonitoringSBOM · level 3 · 5 controlsList only5 products
- SBOM Ingestion & ManagementSBOM · level 3 · 4 controlsList only10 products
Framework coverage
What this selection alone would let you evidence.
S2C2F
5 of 25
OpenSSF Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework (S2C2F)
AUD-4 · INV-1 · INV-2 · REB-3 · SCA-1
SSDF 1.1
9 of 42
NIST Secure Software Development Framework 1.1 (SP 800-218)
PO.1.1 · PO.4.1 · PS.3.1 · RV.1.1 · PO.1.2 · PO.4.2 · PS.3.2 · RV.2.2 · PO.3.3
Scorecard
1 of 20
OpenSSF Scorecard Checks
SBOM
Coverage by phase
Plan
Not modeledNo attack techniques are modeled against this phase yet. That is a gap in our model, not evidence the phase is safe.
Build
1 countered · 10 open of 11
Release
0 countered · 4 open of 4
Deploy
0 countered · 1 open of 1
Operate
0 countered · 13 open of 13
Monitor
Not modeledNo attack techniques are modeled against this phase yet. That is a gap in our model, not evidence the phase is safe.
What this selection leaves open
Trusted Supplier Compromise
Open12 real incidentsCommon · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 5 capabilities that would: Commercial Software Binary Composition Analysis, Continuous Vendor Risk Monitoring, Nth-Party Dependency Mapping, SaaS & CI/CD Integration Governance, and others.
Maintainer Account Takeover
Open10 real incidentsCommon · Release
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 6 capabilities that would: Developer & Maintainer MFA Enforcement, Maintainer & Publisher Risk Analysis, Malicious Package Detection, Minimum Release Age Enforcement, and others.
Stolen Publishing Token
Open9 real incidentsCommon · Release
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 7 capabilities that would: Access Token Scoping & Least Privilege, Deployment Environment Protection, Engineering Platform Audit Log Monitoring, Leaked Credential Validation & Revocation, and others.
Artifact Tampering After Build
Open7 real incidentsCommon · Release
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 7 capabilities that would: Artifact Digest Integrity Verification, Artifact Signing, Build Provenance Attestation, Dependency Pinning & Lockfile Integrity Verification, and others.
CI Runner Secret Exfiltration
Open5 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 4 capabilities that would: Build Egress Control & Network Monitoring, Pipeline Permission Minimization, Pipeline Runtime Anomaly Detection, Secrets Detection in CI Logs & Artifacts.
Exploitation of Known Vulnerable Component
Open5 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 7 capabilities that would: Container Image Vulnerability Scanning, Coverage-Guided Fuzzing, Minimal Hardened Base Images, Risk-Based Vulnerability Prioritization, and others.
Leaked Secret Abuse
Open5 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 5 capabilities that would: Dynamic Short-Lived Credentials, Leaked Credential Validation & Revocation, Secret Push Protection, Secrets Detection in Source Code, and others.
Malicious Install-Time Script
Open5 real incidentsVery Common · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: Install Script & Package Behavior Analysis, Install Script Execution Restriction, Malicious Package Detection.
Abandoned Package or Domain Takeover
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Release
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: Maintainer & Publisher Risk Analysis, Open Source Project Health Scoring.
Adversary-in-the-Middle MFA Phishing
Open2 real incidentsVery Common · Operate
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 3 capabilities that would: Developer & Maintainer MFA Enforcement, Multi-Factor Authentication, Phishing & Business Email Compromise Protection.
Build Cache Poisoning
Open2 real incidentsEmerging · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 2 capabilities that would: Build Cache Poisoning Prevention, Untrusted Workflow Trigger Isolation.
Dependency Confusion
Open2 real incidentsCommon · Build
Nothing in this pipeline counters it. The graph knows 4 capabilities that would: Dependency Confusion Prevention, Dependency Curation & Allowlisting, Namespace & Package Name Reservation, Private Registry Proxy & Curation.
17 further techniques with no documented incidents
Not in this comparison
- Does not apply to this kind of pipeline
- stages A composed pipeline has no authored stages; its capabilities are grouped by lifecycle phase.
- gaps Gap analysis compares a stage's capabilities against the products that stage uses, and only a client pipeline records products in use. A composed pipeline models the design, not an estate.
How this was produced
Every figure above was read from the Gantry knowledge graph, version 7.1.0, and computed when you opened this page — in 198 ms on 2026-10-27. Nothing here is a cached verdict or a dataset assembled for marketing: it is the same model our engagements run on.